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REED V. ST. ROMAIN:  
EVERYDAY GIFT GIVING AND LEGAL TAXONOMY 
Alexandru-Daniel On∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The facts of Reed v. St. Romain1 are rather mundane. A man, 
Alvin, gave his girlfriend at the time, Judy Ann, a diamond ring.2 
They later split up. Alvin contends that the ring was given in 
contemplation of marriage, as an engagement ring, and since they 
did not go through with the marriage, he wants the ring back.3 Judy 
Ann says that it was nothing of the sort, and contends that it is her 
property. She argues that it was a “shut up” ring or an early 
Christmas present.4  
Although the facts of this case are not very intricate, the law 
that ought to be applied in circumstances such as those described 
above is based on a taxonomy that is not easily navigable. 
Taxonomy is a central element in civilian legal thinking, and much 
of the civil law’s legal imaginarium is based on the intellectual 
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warmly thanks Professor Olivier Moréteau for his help and for the engaging 
conversations on the subject treated herein; Professor Alain Levasseur for his 
notes and comments; Professor Luz M. Martinez Velencoso, Professor Aniceto 
Masferrer, Adrian Tamba and Shane Büchler for their edits and help; and 
Jennifer Lane for the careful final editing of this piece.  
 1. Reed v. St. Romain, 2011-2207 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/12), 2012 WL 
4335329. 
 2. Id. at 1.  
 3. In support of his claim, Alvin Reed testified that he got down on one 
knee and asked Judy Ann to marry him, and she accepted. Id. He also introduced 
as evidence a photograph of her wearing the diamond ring on the “ring finger” 
and a copy of her address book where he was listed as her “fiancé.” Id.  
 4. Judy Ann St. Romain testified that Reed never asked her to marry him 
and that the present was given to her a few days before Christmas as an early 
Christmas present. Id. at 2. She added that they never called each other fiancées 
and that she listed Reed in her address book as her fiancé because she had 
always wished and hoped that one day they would be engaged. Id. Also, on 
cross-examination, Reed acknowledged that they had never set a date for the 
wedding. Id. Kristen Barnhardt, St. Romain’s daughter, also gave testimony 
supporting her mother’s side of the story. Id.  
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attempt to abstractly arrange the law into categories. The 
Aristotelian division, into categories and subcategories, brings 
logic, thoroughness and credibility to the system, but taxonomy 
has its traps and challenges. Civilian methodology requires that the 
facts of a case be placed inside the proper box or container in order 
to correctly determine the juridical effects of the facts in question, 
a process that can be relatively straightforward, but might also at 
times look like opening a Russian Matryoshka doll. Of course, 
things become even more challenging in borderline cases, when 
finding the right box also entails discovering the reasoning behind 
the categories (the ratio legis) and the boundaries between them. 
The theoretical model for the law applicable to cases like Reed 
is more complex, yet more fluid and flexible than one would 
expect. The purpose of this case note is to go beyond the analysis 
and critique of the Reed opinion, and explore some distinctions 
that are essential to a better understanding of the law applicable in 
similar cases.  
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals in Reed focused on the issues of fact, and 
found that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in deciding 
that the ring was a “shut up” ring and not an engagement ring.5 
Accordingly, Judy Ann was allowed to keep it. In its analysis, the 
court cited articles 14686 and 15567 of the Louisiana Civil Code 
and decided that, based on these articles, as applied to the facts, the 
parties entered into an “irrevocable donation.”  
 5. Id. at 2-3.  
 6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468: “A donation inter vivos is a contract by which 
a person, called the donor, gratuitously divests himself, at present and 
irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of another, called the donee, who accepts 
it.” 
 7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1556: “A donation inter vivos may be revoked 
because of ingratitude of the donee or dissolved for the nonfulfillment of a 
suspensive condition or the occurrence of a resolutory condition. A donation 
may also be dissolved for the nonperformance of other conditions or charges.” 
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III. COMMENTARY 
A. A Brief and Cryptic Opinion 
One might reasonably wonder how the court arrived at this 
result, because the opinion lacks a proper and convincing 
demonstration. The main focus is on issues of fact, all the legal 
issues being treated in a rather brief and cryptic manner in just one 
paragraph at the beginning of the opinion.8 The court simply cited 
the above-mentioned civil code articles, as if their recitation would 
automatically bring light as to how they apply to the facts of the 
case.  
Based on the opinion as a whole, it is evident that the court had 
two possible legal rules in mind: on the one hand, if the ring was 
an early Christmas present or a “shut up” gift (and this version of 
the facts was found more plausible), this meant that the parties 
entered into a definitive, non-conditional donation (the court used 
the term “irrevocable”);9 on the other hand, if the gift had been an 
engagement ring, this court probably would have found that the 
donation would have been subject to a resolutory condition.10  
The court in the end decided the case correctly. Indeed, if the 
gift was not made in contemplation of marriage, as an engagement 
present, the donee became the owner from the moment the 
possession of the ring was exchanged (traditio),11 and the donation 
was not subject to any condition.12  
The facts from Reed present, however, an opportunity to 
discuss a few fine distinctions that are rarely mentioned in the legal 
literature. Placing a ring on a loved one’s finger can, according to 
the circumstances, be an act having the nature of either a usual gift 
 8. Reed v. St. Romain, supra note 1, at 1. 
 9. “Non-conditional” and “irrevocable” are not synonyms. See infra Part 
III.C.  
 10. Based on the fact that LA. CIV. CODE art. 1556 was cited by the court. 
 11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1543: “The donation inter vivos of a corporeal 
movable may also be made by delivery of the thing to the donee without any 
other formality.” 
 12. See infra Part III.C. 
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or a donation,13 and such an act can be either definitive or 
conditional.14 Surrounding circumstances such as the occasion 
when the gift was made, the value of the gift, the fortune of the 
donor, any accompanying words or gestures, and previous or 
subsequent conduct, can lead to a different interpretation of the 
facts, a different legal qualification of the act, and different 
juridical effects. 
In Reed, the first distinction, between donations and usual gifts, 
was not even mentioned by the court, and it probably would not 
have made any difference in the outcome of the case. In future 
cases, however, this distinction might be quite important, and there 
is very little guidance in Louisiana doctrine on this issue.15 The 
next section of this case note (section B) will analyze the 
distinction between the two types of acts based on the general 
theory of juridical acts, and section C will briefly discuss the 
distinction between conditional and non-conditional gifts.  
B. Donations and Usual Gifts 
1. The General Theory of Juridical Acts—Basic Notions 
Although the answer might, at first sight, seem obvious, the 
first problem a court must consider in a case like Reed is whether 
the act of giving a ring to a loved one is juridical or non-juridical in 
nature.  
 13. See infra Part III.B. 
 14. See infra Part III.C. 
 15. In Louisiana, the category of “usual gifts” is only briefly mentioned in 
the legal literature, and their treatment is limited to identifying the different 
requirements and effects of such acts in the law of successions or matrimonial 
regimes. See KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, 10 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, 
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 7:14, 10:6 (2d ed., West 2009-2011); 
MAUNSEL W. HICKEY ET AL., 1 LA. PRAC. EST. PLAN. § 4:49, 4:85 (2013-2014 
ed., West); KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, 16 LA. CIV. L. 
TREATISE, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 1.10 (3d ed., West 2006-2012). 
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A juridical act is an act of volition, a manifestation of will, 
expressed with the intent to produce juridical effects.16 An act of 
volition can be unilateral, giving rise to a unilateral act, or it can 
be bilateral, as it is most often the case, or multilateral, giving rise 
to a contract (a bilateral or multilateral act).  
 16. ALAIN LEVASSEUR, RANDALL TRAHAN & SANDI VERNADO, LOUISIANA 
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS. A METHODOLOGICAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3 
(Carolina Academic Press 2013); FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 
AU DROIT 165 (7th ed., Dalloz 2006); JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL. 
INTRODUCTION 268 (22d ed., PUF 1994); Claude Brenner, Acte juridique, at no. 
10, in ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ. RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2013). The 
term declaration of will (déclaration de volonté) has also been used in the 
literature. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, 2 LE DROIT DES 
OBLIGATIONS. PARTIE DU DROIT ROMAIN ACTUEL 82 (T. Hippert trans., Bruylant-
Cristophe & Co. 1873). In Louisiana, the late Professor Saúl Litvinoff used the 
term “declaration” of will when proposing a definition for juridical acts. SAÚL 
LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE. THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 12 
(WEST 2001); and SAÚL LITVINOFF & W. THOMAS TÊTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL 
TRANSACTIONS. THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 105 (Claitor’s Publ’g 
Division 1969). The Louisiana Civil Code also refers to “other declarations of 
will” in article 1757, where the sources of obligations are enumerated. LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 1757. The term “manifestation” is preferable because it is broader, 
and encompasses all non-verbal communication. One might doubt, for instance, 
whether some manual gifts would be seen as originating from “declarations” of 
will, when all that the donor does is place a gift in the hands of the donee, 
without a written act or without saying anything.  
It is also worth mentioning other definitions of juridical acts that have been 
proposed in doctrinal works. Some authors tried to improve the definition laid 
down above by adding reference to the obligational contents of juridical acts. 
See BORIS STARK, HENRI ROLAND & LAURENT BOYER, INTRODUCTION AU 
DROIT 553 (3d ed., Litec 1991). Others have tried to offer definitions where the 
subjective element (the will) is coupled with objective considerations, in order to 
better distinguish juridical acts from juridical facts. See EMMANUEL GOUNOT, LE 
PRINCIPE DE L’AUTONOMIE EN DROIT PRIVÉ. CONTRIBUTION À L’ÉTUDE CRITIQUE 
DE L’INDIVIDUALISME JURIDIQUE (Rousseau 1912) 246-47 (arguing that a 
juridical act is created only when the manifestation of will is aimed at 
organizing the effects of the act, and not merely intending them, thus 
(over)emphasizing the normative element of juridical acts); JACQUES MARTIN 
DE LA MOUTTE, L’ACTE JURIDIQUE UNILATÉRAL; ESSAI SUR SA NOTION ET SA 
TECHNIQUE EN DROIT CIVIL 26 (Bernard Frères 1951) (arguing that it is not 
enough for the will to intend the juridical effects generated by the act; the 
manifestation of will must also be “necessary” for the effects to be produced); 
and JEAN HAUSER, OBJECTIVISME ET SUBJECTIVISME DANS L’ACTE JURIDIQUE 
70, 322 (L.G.D.J. 1971) (arguing that the role of the will is limited to the 
initiative to enter into an operation that has juridical content; in a view that 
combines objective and subjective elements, the author considers that the effects 
of the act spring exclusively from the law, but the actor’s initiative to enter into 
such an act, while not a source, is a necessary trigger). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
736 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 6 
 
A juridical act must cumulatively fulfill three conditions that 
can be extracted from the above-mentioned definition: (1) it needs 
to be a manifestation of will; (2) it must produce juridical effects; 
and (3) the juridical effects must be intended by the author.17 
The latter condition is of special interest for the facts presented 
in Reed. By placing the ring on Judy Ann’s finger, Alvin expressed 
his will.18 Also, the act produced legal effects, as ownership of the 
ring was transferred to Judy Ann (the court later recognizing this 
translative effect in its decision). However, not all intentional acts 
of volition that produce juridical effects are juridical acts. Many 
are classified as juridical facts, like intentional delicts,19 or the 
management of (another’s) affairs.20 What differentiates juridical 
acts from juridical facts is precisely the author’s intent for the act 
to produce juridical effects. It is rather exotic to think, for instance, 
that somebody would commit a battery with the intent to pay 
reparation.21 Also, in the case of a management of another’s 
affairs, the specific intent is to help or act for the interest of 
another,22 but not necessarily to generate the obligations that arise 
from this fact.23  
 17. Brenner, supra note 16, at no. 10. The third condition need not be 
understood in its most absolute meaning. It is enough for the author of the act to 
understand and intend the principal effects of the act, and not every possible 
legal consequence that comes with concluding a juridical act.  
 18. Judy Ann’s acceptance of the ring when placed on her finger makes the 
juridical act bilateral, as her will joined Alvin’s to form a contract. 
 19. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315. 
 20. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2292.  
 21. Some French scholars adjusted the definition of juridical acts in order to 
anticipate this sort of bizarre event, and argue that a juridical act is not simply an 
act wherein the juridical effects are intended, but also where the effects 
necessarily follow from that intent. MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 16, at 
26. For instance, if the actor commits a delict with the intent to pay reparation, 
the act would still be a delict and not a unilateral juridical act, because if the 
intent to pay reparation were missing, the act would produce effects anyway (as 
a delict). Id.  
 22. The intent to be of service to another need not be the exclusive reason 
why the gestor manages the affairs of another. A cause of action based on 
management of affairs is recognized even if he also had selfish reasons for 
rendering the performance. SAÚL LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE 
LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE: A COURSEBOOK 465 (6th ed., LSU Law Center 
 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] REED V. ST. ROMAIN 737 
 
More importantly, the intent to produce juridical effects also 
differentiates juridical acts from what could be called “non-
juridical acts.” These acts take the form of agreements, which 
apparently resemble juridical acts, but in fact are not intended to be 
binding. The typical example is a gentlemen’s agreement,24 
practiced so often in commercial settings. Also, acts like helping, 
or promising to help, a friend move some furniture or paint his 
house, qualify as non-juridical manifestations of will.25 If the 
intent to be legally bound is missing, as a matter of principle,26 the 
manifestation of will cannot and will not produce juridical effects. 
2008); and Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d 
435, 439 n.9 (La. Ct. App. 1957). 
 23. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, PHILIPPE SIMLER & YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT CIVIL. 
LES OBLIGATIONS 991 (9th ed., Dalloz 2005).  
 24. See Bruno Oppetit, L’engagement d’honneur, D. 1979 Chron. 107. 
However, the idea that gentlemen’s agreements are non-juridical acts needs to 
be nuanced. While in some of these agreements the parties really intend to give 
rise to mere moral obligations, there are many situations in which the intent is to 
place the agreement outside of state law, but the effectivity of the agreement is 
beyond doubt, and the parties do feel bound by their promisses. Id. at 108. See 
also Cass Com., January 23, 2007, D. 2007 Act. Jurisp. 442, obs. Xavier 
Delpech; RTD. Civ. 2007, at 340, obs. Jacques Mestre & Betrand Fages. With a 
pluralist view on what the law is, one could argue that there are two types of 
gentlemen’s agreements: on the one hand, if the parties of the agreement do not 
want to be bound except in conscience, or otherwise said, the act shall not have 
any binding effect, the gentlemen’s agreement would be a veritable non-juridical 
act; on the other hand, if the gentlemen’s agreement is concluded with the intent 
to apply a different law to the transaction, a law other than state law, either 
created by the parties themselves, or chose by the parties from other non-etatic 
regulatory sources (like, for instance, lex mercatoria), then it is a veritable 
juridical act, because the parties do intend to be bound by their will and subject 
the act to some form of normative background (law lato sensu).  
 25. For instance, if Primus promises to Secundus, his best friend, that he 
will help him with some gardening work, he is not bound by this promise, unless 
it is reasonable to think that the parties meant for the obligations resulting from 
the agreement to be legally enforceable. Other examples of apparent 
manifestations of will that are not intended to produce effects include: 
manifestations of will that were intended as mere jokes or jests, the recitation of 
a line in a theater play or on the set of a movie, the example a law professor 
gives in class, etc. 
 26. The exceptions to this rule are based on theories of good faith and 
reasonable reliance and are intended primarily to secure the setting for 
commercial or civil transactions. For instance, if a person makes an offer which 
apparently fulfills every condition of a valid offer, but does not really intend to 
be bound, his real intentions being reserved solely within his own mind, and a 
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Therefore, in order to determine whether or not the agreement 
between Alvin and Judy Ann is a juridical act, and, to be more 
exact, a contract, one would have to look into the specific intent of 
the parties.  
2. Gift-Giving—Always a Juridical Act? 
Under the civil code, gift giving implies donative intent 
(animus donandi). This intent usually is materialized into a 
contract of donation, which is a recognized juridical act,27 and, 
more accurately, a nominate contract (its special rules regarding 
formation and effects being laid down in Book 3, Title 2 of the 
Louisiana Civil Code).  
However, not all gifts necessarily fall within the scope of the 
provisions from this title of the code. Low value and symbolic gifts 
(like, for instance, Christmas or engagement presents), generically 
named “usual or customary gifts”28 (présents d’usage),29 are not 
subject to the codal provisions regarding donations. Some authors 
even wonder whether usual gifts can be placed within the category 
of juridical acts,30 as they seem to have been exempted from many 
good faith offeree accepts the offer, the former will be bound by his declaration 
of will despite his real intent. LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 16, at 114. In 
Germany, this principle has been codified in art. 116 of the BGB: “A declaration 
of intent is not void by virtue of the fact that the person declaring has made a 
mental reservation that he does not want the declaration made. The declaration 
is void if it is to be made to another person who knows of the reservation” 
(Translation by Langenscheidt Translation Service, available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html). 
 27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468. 
 28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2349: “The donation of community property to a 
third person requires the concurrence of the spouses, but a spouse acting alone 
may make a usual or customary gift of a value commensurate with the economic 
position of the spouses at the time of the donation” (emphasis added).  
 29. M. E.-H. Perreau, Courtoisie, complaisance et usages non obligatoires 
devant la jurisprudence, 13 RTD Civ. 481, 512 (1914). 
 30. IONEL REGHINI, ȘERBAN DIACONESCU & PAUL VASILESCU, 
INTRODUCERE ÎN DREPTUL CIVIL 429-30 (Hamangiu 2013); and Perreau, supra 
note 29, at 512.  
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of the prerequisites of juridical acts, and are deprived of many of 
the usual effects of donations. 
Usual gifts are exempted from capacity requirements. For 
instance, a minor can validly make an ordinary gift (like a modest 
Christmas present or a flower to a girlfriend),31 although he does 
not have the capacity to make liberalities (donations or a 
testament).32 Other legal restrictions also do not apply: usual gifts 
are not subject to the requirement of mutual consent of the spouses 
for the conclusion of gratuitous dispositions on community 
property;33 as to their effects, usual gifts are not subject to 
collation,34 and obviously, it would also be absurd to subject them 
to reduction. Also, they are, of course, not subject to the authentic 
form requirement.35  
A gift is considered a présent d’usage when two conditions are 
fulfilled: (1) the value of the thing is low by comparison to the 
 31. PHILIPPE MALAURIE ET AL., DROIT CIVIL. LES SUCCESSIONS. LES 
LIBÉRALITÉS 182 (Éditions Cujas 1998). 
 32. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1476:  
A minor under the age of sixteen years does not have capacity to make 
a donation either inter vivos or mortis causa, except in favor of his 
spouse or children. 
A minor who has attained the age of sixteen years has capacity to make 
a donation, but only mortis causa. He may make a donation inter vivos 
in favor of his spouse or children. 
 33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2349. See André Colmer, Communauté, at no. 801, 
in ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ. RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2013).  
 34. LORIO, supra note 15, at 7:14; Succession of Gomez, 67 So. 2d 156, 162 
(La. 1953). See also, art. 852 of the French Civil Code: “The expenses of food, 
support, education, apprenticeship, the ordinary costs of outfitting, those of 
weddings and usual presents, shall not be collated.” The Louisiana equivalent of 
the French article 852 is LA. CIV. CODE art. 1244, which is phrased differently: 
“Neither the expenses of board, support, education and apprenticeship are 
subject to collation, nor are marriage presents which do not exceed the 
disposable portion.” Usual presents are not enumerated in art. 1244, but based 
on the legislative history of this article, it must be interpreted as also excluding 
usual gifts from collation. LORIO, supra note 15, at 7:14.  
 35. Ibrahim Najjar, Donations, at no. 85, in ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ. 
RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2013). The lack of authentic form is not 
necessarily an exception to the general rules that apply to other donations, 
because usual gifts are almost always made in the form of manual gifts.  
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fortune of the donor; and (2) the present is made on the occasion of 
a social event or in a family setting.36 
In order to explain this sui generis category of gifts, French 
legal doctrine developed two main theories that attempt to explain 
their nature.  
The first theory places usual gifts somewhere in-between moral 
and legal realms, by resorting to the mechanism of natural 
obligations.37 This theory is based on the argument that since these 
gifts are made in social or family settings, the “donor” feels bound 
in conscience before making the gift, and the making of the gift 
relieves him of this moral duty. However, if the act of making 
usual gifts is seen as the performance of a pre-existing natural 
obligation, usual gifts are not, properly said, donations.38 The 
performance of an obligation is incompatible with the ideas of 
“liberality” and “donative intent.” This onerous nature of usual 
gifts would explain the difference as to the exemption from 
collation, or from the rules regarding community property. 
Moreover, if the volitional act is considered non-juridical, and only 
the traditio (the performance) produces juridical effects, the rules 
regarding capacity can also be justified by this theory. 
That being said, even though the effects of usual gifts are 
deduced very elegantly from the way natural obligations work, the 
whole theoretical construct is based on two fictions that ignore or 
distort the will of the parties. First, the role of the will as a basis for 
transferring ownership is minimized, and the translative effect of 
the act is linked to the transfer of possession alone (traditio). 
Second, this theory presumes that the intent to extinguish a moral 
duty is the cause of the act, and not the author’s liberal intent 
(animus donandi). The moral circumstances and the social pressure 
 36. Id. at no. 86. 
 37. Perreau, supra note 29, at 512. 
 38. The performance of a natural obligation cannot be described as a 
liberality, the same way a contract wherein the objective cause of one of the 
obligations is a preexisting natural obligation cannot be a gratuitous act. 
LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE…, supra note 16, at 33. 
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that exist when making these presents can serve as a motive for 
making the gift (the subjective cause of the act), but the liberal 
intent is clearly present (the objective cause of the act is animus 
donandi).39 It is rather cynical to describe giving a Christmas 
present as the fulfillment of a duty, and not gift-giving.  
That is why the second theory, which describes usual gifts as 
veritable donations, a sub-category of manual gifts, subject to a 
different legal regime,40 is more convincing.41 When one makes an 
ordinary gift, the specific intent is to transmit, gratuitously, 
ownership of the object to the donee, and this intent is enough to 
characterize the act as juridical and, consequently, a donation. 
Custom and practical considerations justify the different legal 
regime applicable to this category of manual gifts, and not the 
mechanism of natural obligations: usual gifts are part of ordinary 
social interaction, their rules are dictated by local social standards 
(that might also vary in time), and are made on so many social 
occasions that it might be excessively burdensome to keep track of 
them in order to apply the full extent of consequences attached to 
donations.  
 39. For a detailed presentation of the distinction between subjective cause 
and objective cause, see Judith Rochfeld, Cause, at nos. 14-19, in 
ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ. RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2013). 
 40. See Najjar, supra note 35, at no. 84.  
 41. A Spanish author has developed an intermediary opinion, which 
describes usual gifts as liberalities, and rejects the idea that such gifts are, in 
fact, a way of performing a preexisting natural obligation, but considers them 
some sort of sui generis liberalities, and not donations. Ramón M. Roca Sastre, 
La donación remuneratoria, 31 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 823, 839-40 
(1947). In support of this opinion, the author argues that the cause of usual gifts 
is the intent to conform to a prevailing usage, and not animus donandi. Id. at 
840. Liberal intent (animus donandi or animus testandi) is what distinguishes 
liberalities from onerous acts, and to say that usual gifts are liberalities without 
animus donandi is a contradiction in terms. Furthermore, the author seems to 
reject the incidence of custom as the normative background for usual gifts and 
emphasized the role of prevailing usages, and that might have given rise to 
confusion between the cause of the act (an internal element) and the source of 
law that applies to usual gifts (an external element). See id. at 839. Saying that 
the cause of usual gifts is the intent to respect a prevailing usage is like saying 
that the cause of a sale is to respect the civil code.  
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Arguably, one could easily dismiss the hypothesis of usual gifts 
in a case like Reed, because the present was a diamond ring. 
Therefore, although the gift was made on the occasion of a social 
event (in either hypothesis: a Christmas present or on the occasion 
of the couple’s engagement), a strong argument can be made that 
the gift is valuable enough to exclude any possibility of 
characterizing it as a usual or customary gift. The value of the 
diamond ring alone, however, is not enough. The relative value of 
the ring, determined by comparison with the donor’s patrimonial 
situation, will determine whether or not the gift falls within one 
category or another, and not its objective value.42  
3. The Juridical Nature of Engagement Presents 
The distinction between donations, as regulated in the code, 
and usual gifts, is of particular significance in the context of 
engagement presents. Based on previous jurisprudence, in 
Louisiana engagement presents are considered to be conditional 
donations, because they are made in contemplation of marriage.43  
This rule is of jurisprudential origin, and the question can come 
up in the future whether low-value engagement presents that would 
qualify as usual or customary gifts would be subject to the same 
type of resolutory condition. According to the natural obligation 
theory,44 usual gifts could not be made conditional because they 
are in fact the means of performing a pre-existing obligation, and 
therefore, as soon as the gift is made, the obligation is 
 42. See Cass 1re Civ., December 30, 1952, D. 1953 161, JCP 1953 II. 7475 
(Fr.) (the French Court of Cassation decided in this case that, given the vast 
fortune of the donor, a sumptuous diamond bracelet was a usual or customary 
gift, even though it was objectively very valuable). Contra, see HICKEY ET AL., 
supra note 15, at § 4:49.  
 43. Decuers v. Bourdet, 10 La. App. 361, 120 So. 880 (1929); Daigle v. 
Fournet, 141 So. 2d 406 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Glass v. Wiltz, 551 So. 2d 32 (La. 
Ct. App. 1989); and Busse v. Lambert, 773 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2000).  
 44. See Perreau, supra note 29, at 512. 
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extinguished. However, based on the donation theory,45 at least 
theoretically, even low-value gifts could be made conditional.  
In France, low-value engagement presents are considered non-
conditional, except for family heirlooms,46 the resolutory condition 
being implied in the latter case in order to keep these objects in the 
family of the donor.  
Seeing how the rules regarding engagement presents are deeply 
grounded in custom47 or usages,48 their possible transplant into 
Louisiana jurisprudence would need to be done with care.49 Courts 
have to be deferential to the parties will, their societal expectations, 
and local customs or usages. There is no set recipe for determining 
what the parties intend and expect when making engagement 
presents, and U.S. jurisdictions give a powerful example in this 
regard, as other states have adopted substantially different rules in 
dealing with the issue of ownership of engagement presents when 
engagements are broken.50  
 45. See Najjar, supra note 35, at no. 84. 
 46. GÉRARD CORNU, DROIT CIVIL. LA FAMILLE 272 (9th ed., Montchrestien 
2006); PHILIPPE MALAURIE & HUGUES FULCHIRON, DROIT CIVIL. LA FAMILLE 
78 (2d ed., Defrénois 2006); DROIT DE LA FAMILLE 58-59 (Pierre Murat dir., 
Dalloz Action 2008-2009); and JEAN HAUSER & DANIÈLE HUET-WEILLER, 
TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL. LA FAMILLE. FONDATION ET VIE DE LA FAMILLE 41-42 
(Jacques Ghestin dir., L.G.D.J. 1993). 
 47. CORNU, supra note 46, at 272. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1: “The sources of 
law are legislation and custom” (emphasis added). 
 48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4: “When no rule for a particular situation can be 
derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to 
equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing 
usages” (emphasis added).  
 49. To this author’s knowledge, so far, Louisiana courts have not decided 
any case regarding low value engagement presents, especially based on the 
distinction between usual gifts and family heirlooms.  
 50. Today, based on the foundation of the set of rules that determine the fate 
of engagement presents after an engagement is broken, U.S. jurisdictions can be 
divided into two major categories: (1) States that apply a fault-based test for 
determining whether the donor can recover the ring (i.e., the donor can recover 
only if he is not at fault for breaking the engagement); (2) States that consider 
engagement presents conditional gifts, and recovery is not premised on fault 
(i.e., if the parties do not go through with the marriage, the donor can recover 
the ring even if he is at fault). See Brian L. Kruckenberg, “I don’t”: 
Determining Ownership of the Engagement Ring When the Engagement 
Terminates (note on Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631 (Kan. 1997)), 37 
WASHBURN L.J. 425, 434 (1997-1998); Rebecca Tushnet, Rules of Engagement, 
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C. Conditional and Non-Conditional Gifts 
In determining whether or not a gift is conditional a court must 
find the common intent of the parties. The intent of the parties is 
usually deduced from the manifestation of will itself, which in 
cases where this takes the form of a written document, is rather 
straightforward by comparison to cases that involve manual gifts. 
The mere fact of placing a ring on someone’s finger, like in the 
Reed case, by itself, can hardly explain whether the parties wanted 
to enter into a contract of donation, a loan, a sale, or some other 
contract. It is even harder to find that the parties intended to 
subject the rights or obligations from the act to a modality (a 
condition or a term). However, the accompanying circumstances of 
the act can shed light on the true intent of the parties, and based on 
these extraneous elements, both the nature and the contents of the 
act can be deduced. That is why the court in Reed focused so much 
on whether or not the gift was given with the occasion of the 
parties’ engagement, or for some other reason (as a Christmas 
present, or a “shut up” present).  
That being said, in its argument, the court made a serious 
terminological and conceptual mistake, when it stated in dicta that 
“if the ring was given in contemplation of marriage, it is a 
revocable donation because marriage is the condition which was 
not fulfilled.”51 A donation subject to a condition should never be 
confused with a revocable donation. The two concepts are different 
in both nature and effects. 
107 YALE L.J. 2583, 2591-2607 (1997-1998); Property Law—Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court Holds That Engagement Rings Must Be Returned Regardless of 
who Broke the Engagement—Lindh v. Surnam (case note), 742 A.2d 643 (Pa. 
1999), 113 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1876 (1999-2000); Barbara Frazier, “But I 
Can’t Marry You”: Who is Entitled to the Engagement Ring When the 
Conditional Performance Falls Short of the Altar (comment), 17 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL L. 419, 426-38 (2001); and Brooke A. Blecher, Broken 
Engagements: Who is Entitled to the Engagement Ring?, 34 FAM L. Q. 579, 583-
586 (2000-2001). 
 51. Reed, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added). 
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By default, donations, whether of substantial value or merely 
usual gifts, conditional or non-conditional, are irrevocable. The 
Louisiana Civil Code defines the contract of donation as: “a 
contract by which a person, called the donor, gratuitously divests 
himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of 
another, called the donee, who accepts it.”52 The irrevocability 
prescribed by the civil code must be understood in the sense that 
the donor cannot change his mind after making the donation. If the 
donor reserves the possibility to take the gift back in any way that 
would depend solely on his will, the existence of animus donandi 
is in doubt (and a donation is not valid without a clear donative 
intent).53 That is why article 1530 of the Louisiana Civil Code 
declares that a donation which is conditioned solely on the will of 
the donor is null.54 
 52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468 (emphasis added).  
 53. This is a very old rule in the civil law, being embodied in a general 
maxim: “donner et retenir ne vaut.” The rule evolved from Roman law, where 
donations in general were always regarded with suspicion, and therefore were 
not considered binding until the corporeal possession of the donated thing was 
exchanged (traditio). FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT CIVIL. LES 
SUCCESSIONS. LES LIBÉRALITÉS 351 (3d ed., Dalloz 1997). In the Ancien Droit 
(the French law that existed before the French revolution), the Roman rule was 
reinterpreted to mean that the act of donation cannot allow the donor to reclaim 
the alienated thing (in this form, the rule can be found in the Royal Ordinance of 
1731 regarding donations). Id. Traditionally, the rule is said to be protective of 
the donor, who, knowing that the donation is irrevocable, is made aware of the 
significance of the act of donation, and is supposedly going to make donations 
only after seriously considering whether the act is necessary and whether by 
making the donation he is distributing his fortune fairly (particularly when 
donations are used as means of succession planning). Id. at 352, n.1. Some 
authors consider, however, that another, perhaps more important, reason behind 
the “donner et retenir ne vaut” rule is to protect the donee, who is left 
vulnerable, because the donor can revoke the gift at his whim. Id. at 352. 
MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 31, at 246. A different sanction for donations 
subject to potestative conditions would be necessary, if the principal reason 
would be the protection of the donee. Professor Philippe Malaurie proposed that 
the potestative condition be deemed not written (a sort of partial nullity), with 
the effect of making the donation definitive, instead of nullity of the entire act of 
donation, which would have the effect of bringing the object of the donation 
back into the patrimony of the donor. Id.  
 54. Article 1531 of the Louisiana Civil Code is an expression of the same 
idea. If the donation is conditioned on the payment of future or unexpressed 
debts and charges, the donor can eliminate the advantage conferred upon the 
donee simply by taking on more debts.  
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A conditional donation is perfectly valid, and remains 
irrevocable, as long as the condition is not dependent solely on the 
will of the donor. In the civil law, revocation implies the 
intervention of someone’s will for the purpose of canceling out the 
effects of an initial manifestation of will.55 In other words, in case 
of revocation two separate juridical acts are in play. The initial act 
would have to be a contract (the donation), and the subsequent act, 
the revocation, would be a unilateral act canceling the effects of 
the donation. It is important to emphasize that the subsequent 
unilateral act is the source for the effects on the rights or 
obligations of the first act. That is because, as opposed to 
revocation, when a condition is fulfilled, there is no second 
manifestation of will aimed at canceling the effects of another, 
initial, juridical act. The condition is a part of the initial act and its 
fulfillment or non-fulfillment will generate effects which are 
anticipated by the original act and flow from that original 
manifestation of will.  
Revocation can be non-judicial or judicial. Non-judicial 
revocation operates only in special circumstances, like in cases of 
donations mortis causa.56 Judicial revocation operates for cases of 
ingratitude.57 A conditional donation is irrevocable, unless it falls 
within one of the special circumstances of revocable donations 
described above.58  
In article 1556, the Louisiana Civil Code clearly makes a 
distinction between causes of revocation and causes of dissolution 
 55. GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 920-921 (9th ed., PUF 
2011). 
 56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1469. Before 1942, former Louisiana Civil Code 
article 1749 provided that donations between spouses were revocable. Today, as 
a rule, donations between spouses are irrevocable. However, a right of 
revocation can be introduced by the parties by express stipulation in the act of 
donation, but only if the donation is made by notarial act. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:2351 (2005). 
 57. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1556. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1557.  
 58. For instance, a donation subject to a condition can, of course, be 
revoked for ingratitude by a court, but in that case the act of ingratitude, and not 
the condition, is what makes the donation revocable. 
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of a donation.59 The ingratitude of the donee is a motive for 
revocation, whereas the nonfulfillment of a suspensive condition or 
the fulfillment of a resolutory condition leads to the dissolution of 
the donation.60  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This rather lengthy case note covers more than what would 
generally be necessary when discussing a case like Reed. In itself, 
the case is not very complex, and the decision of the court 
followed Louisiana law. Still, there are a couple of reasons why 
more ground is covered than what would generally be expected of 
a standard case note and why some taxonomical issues are treated 
at length.  
First, a slight change in circumstances would have led the court 
towards a completely different result. If Alvin had made a formal 
engagement proposal when he gave the ring to Judy Ann, the 
donation would have been most probably considered subject to a 
resolutory condition.61 Even then, things might have changed if the 
court found that the contract between the parties was an usual or 
customary gift, and not a conditional donation. And things might 
not stop there, other distinctions becoming relevant within each 
subcategory. That is why it is essential to clearly determine the 
facts in cases like Reed, and applying the law to these facts 
depends on a firm grasp on traditional distinctions of the civil law: 
between juridical and non-juridical acts, between donations and 
ordinary gifts, and between conditional and non-conditional gifts.  
Second, the Civil Code does not have specific and detailed 
rules for circumstances such as those of the Reed case. The degree 
 59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1556: “A donation inter vivos may be revoked 
because of ingratitude of the donee or dissolved for the nonfulfillment of a 
suspensive condition or the occurrence of a resolutory condition. A donation 
may also be dissolved for the nonperformance of other conditions or charges” 
(emphasis added). 
 60. Dissolution in this case is not a sanction and should not be confused 
with dissolution as it appears in Title 4, Chapter 9 of the same Book 3. 
 61. See supra note 43. 
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of abstraction of the general theory of juridical acts is beyond what 
is necessary in a regulatory instrument,62 and such general theories 
were developed after the Code Napoléon entered into force.63 
Also, while usual gifts are mentioned in the code, the distinction 
between these gifts and donations is not made clear, either in the 
code, the jurisprudence, or the existing Louisiana legal doctrine. 
Moreover, while there is more than enough information in the code 
regarding what a condition is and how conditions operate, the code 
itself contains inconsistencies,64 and, as proved by the Reed 
opinion, courts, when discussing conditions, sometimes confuse 
some of the concepts used by the code.65  
For these reasons, it was worth discussing at length the Reed v. 
Saint Romain case, even though the opinion remains, to this day, 
unpublished in the Southern Reporter. Beyond all practical 
concerns, this case provided the perfect alibi for a discussion on 
fundamental notions of private law and traditional civilian 
 62. The Code is not a mere regulatory instrument, but also an instrument of 
liberty, as it creates a framework for the individual will to exert its normative 
power freely. A contract is the law for its parties. Based on deference to 
individual will, judges must devise the best methods of identifying and 
enforcing the nomothetic will. In the civil law, the intent of the parties is the 
criterion for the classification of an act and for determining its contents, and 
ultimately, its effects. 
 63. Brenner, supra note 16, at no. 5. 
 64. Although it is not the purpose of this case note to also make de lege 
ferenda propositions for the Louisiana Civil Code, one problem needs to be at 
least mentioned. While the sections of the code that define conditional 
obligations and describe their effects are relatively well written and modern (see 
arts. 1767-1776), article 1562 of the code (in a section that, improperly, is 
named “exceptions to the rule of the irrevocability of donations inter vivos”), 
oddly distinguishes between suspensive and resolutory conditions as to their 
effects. According to this article, resolutory conditions do not operate 
automatically, like suspensive conditions. The code makes resolutory conditions 
effective only (1) if the parties agree to “dissolve” the contract or (2) by way of 
court action. This creates a hybrid type of resolutory conditions, specific only to 
donations, which operate to some extent like the common law conditions 
subsequent, instead of operating de iure and retroactively, like the resolutory 
conditions described in articles 1767-1776 of the code. Louisiana jurisprudence 
has interpreted art. 1562 to mean that an action for rescission is needed in order 
to give effect to the resolutory condition, in the context of donations. See Busse 
v. Lambert, 773 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 5 Cir.); and Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. 
City of New Orleans, 700 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 4 Cir.). 
 65. Supra Part III.C.  
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categories. These concepts, and, of course, the taxonomy of 
juridical acts, need to be properly understood before arguing or 
deciding similar cases. But their study brings much more than just 
guidance for future cases. The general theory of juridical acts is at 
the height of abstraction, and more than anything, the structure, the 
finesse, the logic, the coherence and symmetry of its taxonomy, 
brings civilians closer to an ideal of order—a right order, for this 
world of men.66 
 66. “Good order” or “ontological order,” as Professor Emeritus Robert A. 
Pascal would say. See Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. 
L. REV. 301, 304, 323 (1998). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
